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THE MICHIGAN PREFERRED USE DOCTRINE AS A
STRATEGY FOR REGIONAL LOW-INCOME
HOUSING DEVELOPMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT
In 1971 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that certain land
uses must be recognized as preferred uses because they advance the
public interest in a general sense.1 The preferred use doctrine, which
is unique to Michigan, has subsequently been developed by the court
in several decisions.- In a recent application of the doctrine,
Smookler v. Wheatfield Township,3 the court held that defendant
Township's economic justifications for exclusion of mobile home
parks were invalid per se.4 In Smookler defendant described a mobile
home district in its zoning ordinance, but failed to designate land
appropriate for this land use.5 Plaintiff, owner of land zoned agri-
cultural and residential, applied for a rezoning to permit use of his
land for a mobile home park. Upon denial of this application, plain-
tiff brought suit, alleging that mobile home parks should be con-
1. Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971).
". Wilkins v. Village of Birch Run, 48 Mich. App. 57, 209 N.W.2d 863
(1973); Binkowski v. Shelby Township, 46 Mich. App. 451, 208 N.W.2d 243
(1973), Sabo v. Monroe Township, 46 Mich. App. 344, 208 N.W.2d 57 (1973);
Smookler v. Wheatfield Township, 46 Mich. App. 162, 207 N.W.2d 464 (1973);
Johnson v. Lyon Township, 45 Mich. App. 491, 206 N.W.2d 761 (1973); George v.
Harrison Township, 44 Mich. App. 357, 205 N.W.2d 254 (1973); Rodd v. Palmyra
Township, 42 Mich. App. 434, 439, 202 N.W.2d 446, 448 (1972) (O'Hara, J.,
dissenting); Jamens v. Shelby Township, 41 Mich. App. 461, 474, 200 N.W.2d
479, 486 (1972) (Bronson, J., concurring); Midland Township v. Rapanos, 41
Mich. App. 75, 199 N.W.2d 548 (1972); Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 41
Mich. App. 21, 199 N.W.2d 567 (1972); Congregation Dovid Ben Nuchim v.
City of Oak Park, 40 Mich. App. 698, 199 N.W.2d 557 (1972); Green v. Lima
Township, 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972); Baker v. City of Algonac,
39 Mich. App. 526, 198 N.W.2d 13 (1972); Cohen v. Canton Township, 38 Mich.
App. 680, 197 N.W.2d 101 (1972); Simmons v. City of Royal Oak, 38 Mich.
App. 496, 196 N.W.2d 811 (1972).
3. 46 Mich. App. 162, 207 N.W.2d 464 (1973).
4. Id. at 164, 207 N.W.2d at 465.
5. All three previous requests for rezoning to permit mobile home parks had been
denied. On the problem of the "floating zone" see 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING § 5.16 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]; D. HAGMAN,
URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW § 62 (1971).
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sidered preferred uses. The circuit court denied relief, holding that
defendant Township had met its burden of showing that community
needs of health, safety and welfare far outweighed those of the
regional public interest in providing living space for low-income
families.6 Applying the preferred use doctrine, the court of appeals
of Michigan reversed, holding that the Township had failed to justify
total exclusion of mobile home parks from the municipality.7
Since the preferred use doctrine modifies the traditional presump-
tion of validity of zoning ordinances, analysis of the doctrine must
begin with an examination of traditional zoning law. In 1926, in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,8 the United States Supreme
Court held that municipalities could regulate land uses through zon-
ing ordinances. These ordinances, provided they bear a substantial
relation to a proper purpose of the police power, were given a pre-
sumption of validity.9 The application of this presumption was limited
by the following caveat: "It is not meant by this, however, to exclude
the possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far
outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would
not be allowed to stand in the way."'1 In its decision, however, the
Court applied the presumption of validity test without balancing re-
gional housing needs of the metropolitan area with local land use
policy.1
6. As evidence for this determination, the trial court found: (1) the proposed
mobile home park when completed would double the population of Wheatfield
and more than double the number of housing units; (2) Wheatfield had no fire
protection and depended on the City of Wiliamston and other townships for such
protection; and (3) Wheatfield had no police protection and depended on the
county sheriff and the state police. 46 Mich. App. at 163-64, 207 N.W.2d at 465.
7. This holding is directly based upon the interpretation of the preferred use
doctrine in Green v. Lima Township, 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972).
8. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
9. See ANDERSON § 7.03; D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRON-
MENT 645 (2d ed. 1971). Professor Mandelker finds that the Euclid Court failed
in its land use planning strategy by: (1) not reviewing the economic class bias
inherent in the community's zoning ordinance, (2) creating the myth that the
Village of Euclid was a homogeneous, densely populated community, (3) main-
taining a misguided support for the separation of incompatible uses, and (4) de-
fending the single-family residential zone as the optimal land use category.
10. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926).
11. See Bronstein & Erickson, Zoning Amendments in Michigan-Two Recent
Developments, 50 J. URBAN L. 729 (1973); Fisher, The General Public Interest
v. The Presumption of Zoning Ordinance Validity: A Debatable Question, 50 J.
URBAN L. 129 (1972).
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In Michigan, courts have traditionally held that the Euclid pre-
sumption of validity test applies to local regulation of all land uses.12
In contesting a zoning ordinance, a property owner has had the
burden of proving that the reasonableness of the ordinance was be-
yond a "debatable question":
This is not to say, of course, that a local body may with impunity
abrogate constitutional restraints. The point is that we require
more than a debatable question. . . . It must appear that the
clause attacked is an arbitrary fiat ... and that there is no room
for a legitimate difference of opinion concerning its reasonable-
ness.13
The "debatable question" test has failed to provide a sufficient guide-
line for the Michigan judiciary to determine the reasonableness of a
municipal zoning ordinance. 14 This failure has resulted from (1)
inherent conflict between community-serving exclusionary zoning and
regional planning needs, 15 and (2) lack of a standard that could be
employed to protect land uses crucial to regional public needs.16
12. See Biske v. City of Troy, 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969); June
v. City of Lincoln Park, 361 Mich. 95, 104 N.W.2d 792 (1960); Gust v. Town-
ship of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955); Anderson v. Township
of Highland, 21 Mich. App. 64, 174 N.W.2d 909 (1969). See also R. HEGEL,
MOBILE HOME ZONING, BUILDING AND SITE REGULATIONS, AND TAXATION-m-
PLICATIONS FOR MICHIGAN MUNICIPALITIES 32 (1970). According to Anderson:
"[In Gust] it]he court's emphasis was upon the denial of an immediate, income-
producing use of land rather than upon the failure to provide space for multiple
homes. Later Michigan decisions reached the same result, placing somewhat more
emphasis on the exclusion or the practical exclusion of the use." 2 ANDERSON §
11.51.
13. Brae Burn, Inc. v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich. 425, 432, 86 N.W.2d
166, 170 (1957). On the problem of the "fairly debatable issue" test see ANDER-
SON § 2.16; 7 URBAN L. ANN. 267 (1974).
14. C. CRAWFORD, MICHIGAN ZONING AND PLANNING § 7.01 (1965).
15. See note 11 supra. See also Feller, Metropolitanization and Land-Use
Parochialism-Toward a Judicial Attitude, 69 MicH. L. REv. 655 (1971); 7
URBAN L. ANN. 296 (1974).
16. See PEPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILD-
ING THE AMERICAN CIrr 211-17 (1968). Concerning fiscal zoning, the Com-
mission reported:
In many areas mobile homes are not taxable as real property. And in some
States they are not subject to local personal property taxes because of special
State levies, the imposition of which may exempt them from local taxes. In
New York State, mobile homes are taxable as real property ... The high
exclusion rate in New York may thus indicate an even greater amount of
exclusion in other States.
Id. at 216.
See also Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of
North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRAcusE L. Rlv. 475 (1971). In the Williams
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
The inadequacy of the "debatable question" test for deciding the
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance has led the Michigan judiciary
to question the traditional Euclid test for determining the validity
of zoning ordinances. Applying the Euclid test, the courts have held
that the exclusion of churches,'1 hospitals8 and natural resources'0
from a community is unreasonable. Prior to 1971, however, a "pre-
ferred use doctrine" had not been articulated by the Michigan ju-
diciary as a modification of the traditional presumption of validity
doctrine.
With its decision in Bristow v. City of Woodhaven,20 the Michigan
Court of Appeals first announced the preferred use doctrine. In
Bristow the trial court struck down a zoning ordinance because the
ordinance constructively excluded trailer parks from the municipality.
Given the factual context of the case and the then existing judicial
precedent in Michigan,2' the appellate court could have affirmed,
reasoning that the ordinance unreasonably excluded mobile homes.
Instead, the court developed concepts of the "general public interest"
and "preferred land uses" in reaching its holding.22 Applying the
preferred use doctrine, the court reversed, holding that, because the
municipality failed to carry its burden of justifying the prohibition
of "favored" usage (i.e., mobile home parks), its zoning ordinance
was invalid. In seeking to invoke the preferred use doctrine, plain-
tiff must establish that a particular land use substantially advances
and Norman study, mobile homes in the four New Jersey counties surveyed were
generally excluded, both as of right and as conditional uses, from every munici-
pality.
17. Archbishop of Detroit v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389, 53
N.W.2d 308 (1952).
18. Sisters of Bon Secours Hosp. v. City of Grosse Pointe, 8 Mich. App. 342,
154 N.W.2d 644 (1967).
19. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Paris Township, 351 Mich. 434, 88 N.W.2d
705 (1958); City of North Muskegon v. Miller, 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743
(1929).
20. 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971).
21. See Anderson v. Township of Highland, 21 Mich. App. 64, 174 N.W.2d
909 (1969).
22. For a discussion of these concepts and their development see articles cited
in notes 11 & 15 supra.
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the regional public interest23 and is appropriate for a given site.2 4
Usually, both statutory enactments and judicial precedent must be
offered into evidence as recognizing the preferred status of the usage
to the region.25 Once a preferred use is confirmed, the municipality
bears the burden of going forward to justify its prohibition of the
use.26
To carry the burden, the municipality can rely on the following
justifications for restricting or prohibiting a preferred use: (1) lack
of need for the proposed usage, (2) overabundance of similar exist-
ing uses, (3) presentation of predesigned and available sites better
suited for the usage, (4) existence of a rational, flexible master plan
that would carry weight only when noticeably implemented, or (5)
affirmative proof that an unwanted and yet necessary use is not being
"pushed off" onto neighboring communities where it may be equally
unwantedY.7 The preferred use doctrine and test for zoning justifica-
tion provide a workable standard through which the "general public
interest" can be advanced.2-  This standard has been altered in sub-
23. In its determination that mobile home parks substantially advance the gen-
eral public interest of the region, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that a "mas-
sive nation-,ide housing shortage" existed. Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35
Mich. App. 205, 217, 192 N.W.2d 322, 327 (1971). No empirical data was intro-
duced for this conclusion. Also, no regional economic analysis was provided to
substantiate the validity of the conclusion that mobile home parks would signifi-
cantly advance the general public interest of the region.
24. See Binkowski v. Shelby Township, 46 Mich. App. 451, 208 N.W.2d 243
(1973). Note that under the minority interpretation of Bristow, the court of
appeals of Michigan does not consider the appropriateness of the preferred use
for a given site. See Green v. Lima Township, 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d
243 (1972).
25. The statutory standard for the presentation of mobile home parks as sub-
stantially advancing the "general public interest" is in MicH. STAT. ANN. §§
5.278(21)-(126) (1973).
26. See Johnson v. Lyon Township, 45 Mich. App. 491, 206 N.W.2d 761
(1973). Under the minority interpretation of Bristow, the court of appeals of
Michigan shifted the burden of proof to the municipality. See Green v. Lima
Township, 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972).
27. Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 219-20, 192 N.W.2d
322, 329 (1971). For a review of the traditional criteria used to test the validity
of zoning ordinances see ANDERSON §§ 2.19-.30.
28. Three other state courts have attempted to protect certain land uses, but
without formulating a preferred use doctrine. In Illinois, mobile home parks have
been protected under a reasonableness test, upon evidence of a regional shortage
of low- and middle-income housing. The burden of proof, however, remains with
plaintiff. See Glassey v. County of Tazewell, 11 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 297
NXE.2d 235 (1973); Schmitt v. Village of Skokie, 6 Il1. App. 3d 177, 285 N.E.2d
202 (1972); Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v. County of Will, 114 Ill. App. 2d 267, 252
19741
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sequent decisions of the Michigan Court of Appeals.
In the post-Bristow era, the preferred use doctrine has not ended
application of the traditional presumption of validity test in Michigan.
Through selective readings of various sections of the Bristow opinion,
the court of appeals of Michigan has applied the preferred use doc-
trine without consistent implementation of the Bristow test of zoning
validity.29 The development of the preferred use doctrine has pro-
duced two schools of interpretation-one applying the Bristow test as
a modification of the traditional presumption of validity test, and the
other emphasizing the doctrine as a strategy for regional low-income
housing development.
In the majority of decisions interpreting Bristow, however, the
Michigan Court of Appeals has applied the preferred use doctrine
as a modification of the traditional presumption of validity test. 0
Under this interpretation, three elements must be established. First,
there must be a determination that the land use has a substantial
N.E.2d 765 (1969).
In Pennsylvania, the commonwealth court and supreme court have altered the
traditional presumption of validity for zoning ordinances. First, the supreme court
has held that zoning ordinances adopted for exclusionary purposes are invalid per
se. The court struck down ordinances that established minimum-size building
lots and prohibited multi-unit dwellings. In these cases, the burden of persuasion
shifted to the municipality. See Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970); In re Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970);
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
215 A.2d 597 (1965). Secondly, the commonwealth court has held that the burden
of producing evidence shifts to the municipality upon proof that a municipal zon-
ing ordinance totally prohibits a legitimate land use. See Beaver Gasoline Co. v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 1 Pa. Commw. 458, 275 A.2d 702 (1971).
In New Jersey the superior court has applied the federal equal protection clause
to protect lower-income households, as a class, from being excluded from munici-
palities. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel,
119 NJ. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (L. Div. 1972); Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971). For
an analysis of these cases see Williams, 23 ZONING DIEST 423 (1971).
29. Of the 15 decisions of the Michigan Court of Appeals in the post-
Bristow period, only three have explicitly acknowledged the full set of criteria in
the Bristow test for zoning validity: Wilkins v. Village of Birch Run, 48 Mich.
App. 57, 209 N.W.2d 863 (1973); Binkowski v. Shelby Township, 46 Mich.
App. 451, 208 N.W.2d 243 (1973); Johnson v. Lyon Township, 45 Mich. App.
491, 206 N.W.2d 761 (1973).
30. The leading theoretical decisions for the majority interpretation of Bristow
are Binkowski v. Shelby Township, 46 Mich. App. 451, 208 N.W.2d 243 (1973);
Johnson v. Lyon Township, 45 Mich. App. 491, 206 N.W.2d 761 (1973); Cohen
v. Canton Township, 38 Mich. App. 680, 197 N.W.2d 101 (1972).
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relationship to the regional public interest31 and, but for restrictive
zoning, is appropriate for a given site.32 Secondly, it must be shown
that the local zoning excludes the preferred use.33 Upon proof of the
first two elements, the burden of going forward is shifted to the
municipality. 34 The burden of persuasion, however, remains with the
party seeking a rezoning. Finally, the unreasonableness of the zoning
ordinance must be established. 35 Plaintiff must prove that the re-
gional public interest outweighs the "general welfare" of the local
community. The governmental unit must rebut a prima fade case
of unreasonableness by "clear, positive, and credible . . . evidence
. .. that would challenge either the existence of a 'favored' status of
the proposed use, the suitability of the site for such a use, the degree
of exclusion, or the legal conclusion of invalidity."36
Under the majority interpretation, the court has not uniformly
applied the preferred use doctrine to encourage regional low-income
housing development.- r Only two of the five criteria in the Bristow
31. Note that under the majority interpretation only two cases, Johnson v.
Lyon Township, 45 Mich. App. 491, 206 N.W.2d 761 (1973), and Sabo v. Mon-
roe Township, 46 Mich. App. 344, 208 N.W.2d 57 (1973), upheld a rezoning of
land under the pretense of furthering the "general public interest" in preferred
uses (i.e., mobile home parks). In Johnson the Michigan Court of Appeals sup-
ported the trial court, finding that no area demand existed for agricultural land
use but that an area demand did exist for low-cost residential space.
32. See note 24 supra.
33. Of this school of interpretation only one case, Cohen v. Canton Township,
38 Mich. App. 680, 197 N.W.2d 101 (1972), would limit the preferred use
doctrine solely to zoning ordinances that completely exclude mobile home parks
from the community.
34. Only three cases explicitly recognize the preferred use doctrine as shifting
the burden of going forward with the evidence to the municipality, as opposed
to shifting the burden of proof. See cases cited note 29 supra. For other state
cases distinguishing between the burden of persuasion and the burden of produc-
tion of evidence see Cole-Collister Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho
558, 468 P.2d 290 (1970); Junar Constr. Co. v. Town Bd., 57 Misc. 2d 727,
293 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
35. If the evidence submitted by plaintiff "conclusively establishes the unreason-
ableness of defendant's zoning ordinance as applied to plaintiffs' property, it is
unnecessary for this Court to resort to the 'preferred' use doctrine .... ." Sabo v.
Monroe Township, 46 Mich. App. 344, 350 n.2, 208 N.W.2d 57, 59 n.2 (1973).
36. Johnson v. Lyon Township, 45 Mich. App. 491, 494, 206 N.W.2d 761,
763 (1973). This standard of proof for the municipal burden of rebuttal is un-
fortunately vague.
37. See, e.g., Binkowski v. Shelby Township, 46 Mich. App. 451, 208 N.W.2d
863 (1973).
1974]
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test for municipal zoning justification 3 have been uniformly applied:
the presentation of predesignated and available sites better suited
for the usage, and the existence of a rational, flexible master plan
that would carry weight only when noticeably implemented.3 D Fo-
cusing upon the former criterion, a showing that the zoning is in-
valid as a whole because of its exclusionary purpose does not compel a
conclusion that the plaintiff's parcel must necessarily be rezoned to
permit the excluded use. 40 Focusing upon the latter criterion, regional
land use needs may be disregarded by a timed schedule of local
development.41
In a minority of cases, the Michigan Court of Appeals has applied
the preferred use doctrine to promote development of moderate- and
low-income housing. The minority view of the doctrine was first ex-
pressed in Green v. Lima Township.42 There the court held that de-
fendant township had failed to prove that exclusion of a proposed
mobile home park was in furtherance of the "general welfare" of the
community.4 3 In reaching its decision, the court found defendant's
justifications inadequate. It rejected defendant's contention that
the proposed mobile home park would increase the burdens, economic
and otherwise, for future services.44
Essential to the Green interpretation of Bristow is the use of the
concept of "general welfare:"
38. See text at note 27 supra.
39. For a discussion of the requirement that zoning be in accordance with a
comprehensive plan see ANDERSON §§ 5.02-.03. Under the interpretation in
Binkowski v. Shelby Township, 46 Mich. App. 451, 208 N.W.2d 243 (1973),
the court of appeals of Michigan would set a lower standard for the master plan
as a criterion for zoning validity, i.e., that master plans "are developed in good
faith and are reasonable as a whole with regard to the needs of the local and the
general community." Id. at 463, 208 N.W.2d at 249.
40. Binkowski v. Shelby Township, 46 Mich. App. 451, 468, 208 N.W.2d 243,
252 (1973).
41. See Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). In Golden the Court of Appeals
of New York upheld an amendment to a zoning ordinance through which sub-
division development would be directed by the scheduled completion dates in an
18-year capital plan. For an analysis of Golden see Franklin, Controlling Urban
Growth-But for Whom?, 24 ZONING DIGEST 307 (1972).
42. 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972).
43. Id. at 663, 199 N.W.2d at 248.
44. Id. at 659-60, 199 N.W.2d at 246.
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Townships such as Lima are heterogeneous governmental units
whose political boundaries are largely artificial. To allow the
first 600 people in an area to use these artificial boundaries to ex-
clude all but certain kinds of people, or those who can afford to
live in favored kinds of housing, or to keep down tax bills of
present property owners, subverts the idea of zoning promoting
the general welfare.45
Under the Green rationale, zoning will be declared invalid if its pri-
mary, purpose is to interfere with the right to housing that potential
entrants can afford.46 Under this view, the court of appeals of Michi-
gan has ruled that local governments must carry the burden of proof
when they seek to exclude preferred uses (i.e., mobile home parks
and multiple-dwelling units).4r Only when the exclusion of low- or
middle-income housing is a side effect of "legitimate community pol-
icy" (e.g., state health standards) will the municipality prevail.48
The significance of the Smookler decision as an application of the
preferred use doctrine lies in its extension of the Green test. In
Smookler the court interpreted Green to hold that defendant Town-
ship's economic justifications for the exclusion of mobile home parks
45. Id. at 663, 199 N.W.2d at 248.
46. In reaching this test the court relied on principles established by two de-
cisions of the Pennsylvania supreme court: In re Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237,
263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of
Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). See note 28 supra. For an analy-
sis of these cases see Strong, 22 ZONING DIGEST 100a (1970); Washburn, Apart-
ments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74 Dica. L. R~v. 634 (1969).
In her article Strong notes that the Pennsylvania cases fail in their strategy to
provide for low-income housing development in regional areas:
What is the likely effect of these decisions on increasing housing opportunities
for people of all incomes? Minimal . . . . The effect of the opinions will be
on municipal density, not income distribution. For the total income spectrum,
what significance is there in the difference in cost between a house on one
acre and a house on two or three acres? . . . Will the various code require-
ments for apartment construction be so demanding that all but the well-off
will be priced out of that market?
Strong, 22 ZONING DIGEST 100a (1970).
47. In addition to encouraging mobile home park development, the Michigan
Court of Appeals has ruled that multiple-dwelling units are preferred uses. See
George v. Harrison Township, 44 Mich. App. 357, 205 N.W.2d 254 (1973);
Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 41 Mich. App. 21, 199 N.W.2d 567 (1972).
The favored status of these units has likewise led the court to place the burden
of proof on the zoning authority to justify a total exclusion of this use.
48. Green v. Lima Township, 40 Mich. App. 655, 661, 199 N.W.2d 243, 247
(1972).
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are invalid per se.49 Contrary to Green, Smooklei establishes that
proof of municipal intent to exclude a particular class of entrants is
unnecessary s0
Like Green, however, Smookier fails to incorporate the Bristow test
for municipal zoning justification in interpreting the preferred use
doctrine. According to the Smookler-Green rationale, any economic
justification for exclusionary zoning is insufficient to meet the Town-
ship's burden of proof because it represents only one of the five
criteria listed in the Bristow test. For this reason Smooler is a minor-
ity view. The Smookier-Green rationale disregards the theory that
zoning ordinances reinforce the sum of the individual choices of a
community51 In addition, the rationale fails to perceive the preferred
use doctrine as a dialectical interplay between the regional public
interest in certain land uses and municipal concerns for fiscal stability
and class bias.52 No regional economic analysis has substantiated the
conclusion that mobile home parks substantially advance the general
public interest of the region5 3 Without this empirical determination,
49. Contrast the Smookler zoning validity test with the equal protection stand-
ard developed in the New Jersey cases cited in note 28 supra.
50. For a review of the income status of average mobile home households see
M. DRURY, MOBILE HOMES: THE UNRECOGNIZED REVOLUTION IN AMERIcWAN
HOUSING (1972). According to Drury's data (taken from a survey for the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development) the median mobile home
household is composed of a husband, wife, and usually one child. About three-
fourths of such households had children under six years of age. The typical hus-
band was under thirty-five, had completed three years of high school, and had a
total income of about $6,700 per annum. In view of this survey Wheatfield Town-
ship's worries about juvenile delinquency or density problems in mobile home
parks appear misguided. Id. at 28-29.
51. For a presentation of this theory of zoning as a community decision-making
process see Mandelker, The Role of Law in the Planning Process, 30 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 26 (1965).
52. See Feiler, 24 ZONING DIGEST 193 (1972). The author states:
The Bristow cases evidence a failure of present zoning techniques to deal with
urban growth and metropolitan development. If the Michigan court means
what it says, it may herald an end to the validity of a community's attempt
to distinguish between types of dwelling units . . . All that may be left to
the community is the right to designate an area for residential use and to
specify height, density, and minimum living area limitations.
Id. at 194.
53. R. NEWCOMB, MOBILE HOME PARKS 31 (1970) (percentage of mobile
home households with incomes under $5,000 is expected to decline by nearly 100%
between 1967 and 1980); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN
HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 108 (1968). In a recent report a sociologist has
commented:
[Vol. 8:207
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the concepts of the "general public interest" and "general welfare,"
so important to Bristow, are ambiguous. 54
In the post-Bristow era the Michigan judiciary is left with the
dilemma of reconciling municipal concerns for fiscal stability and
community homogeneity with regional needs for low- and middle-
income housing. The preferred use doctrine and the Bristow test for
municipal zoning justification have not provided authoritative stand-
ards for determining when the "general public interest" outweighs
a conflicting municipal interest.*
Michael B. Phillips
[A]s of 1966, less than 2 per cent of the mobile home population was Negro.
In part this low percentage can be explained by the variety of means by
which Negroes have been deliberately excluded from mobile-home parks....
[T]he current financing of mobile homes places them beyond the means of
most ghetto families. Most banks require 20 to 25 per cent of the purchase
price as a down payment, and add-on interest charges plus a relatively short
loan period... [mean] high monthly payments in addition to the cost of rent-
ing a space in a park.
S. JOHNSON, IDLE HAVEN: COMMUNITY BUILDING AMONG THE WORKING-CLASS
(fETIRED 164 (1971).
54. See note 11 supra.
*EPILOGUE
Following years of deference to the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Michigan
Supreme Court has recently altered the scope of the preferred use doctrine. In
Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974),
the court held that the exclusion of apartment development from a particular
parcel zoned for single-family residential use was valid. The court explicitly
overruled the minority interpretation of the preferred use doctrine, i.e., that upon
finding a land use is preferred, the burden of proof is shifted to the municipality
to justify the reasonableness of its zoning ordinance. See text at notes 42-48
supra. The majority interpretation of the doctrine, however, was not overruled.
The court failed to recognize the theoretical bifurcation in post-Bristow develop-
ments. See text following note 29 supra. Rather, it proceeded to formulate its
own "legitimate use" doctrine.
Under the Kropf "legitimate use" doctrine, upon a finding that a land use is
legitimate, a zoning ordinance that totally excludes the use from the municipality
is labeled with a "strong taint of unlawful discrimination and denial of equal
protection of law to the excluded use." 391 Mich. at ....... 215 N.W.2d at 185. This
"strong taint," however, is only relevant in answering the ultimate question of
whether the zoning ordinance is valid. Essential to the Kropf test of zoning
validity is proving the unreasonableness of the ordinance. Two alternative
grounds will be recognized as establishing the unreasonableness of the ordinance:
that there exists no reasonable governmental interest advanced by the zoning
classification, or that there exists an arbitrary, capricious and unfounded exclusion
of other types of legitimate uses from the area in dispute. Id. at ......... 215
N.W.2d at 186. Under the first test, the court dismissed the issue by demonstrating
1974]
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the supposed inadequacy of plaintiff's pleading, i.e., that no proof was provided
as to the unreasonableness of developing the parcel for single-family residences,
as opposed to the unreasonableness of excluding multi-unit development from the
parcel by municipal authority. Id. at ........ 215 N.W.2d at 187. Under the
second test, the court invoked the presumption of zoning validity and held that
plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof. Id. at ........ 215 N.W.2d at 187-89.
Several reasons were given by the court for excluding other legitimate land uses
from the parcel: inadequate street facilities for the potential increased traffic re-
sulting from multi-unit development, the floodgate problem of other apartment
developers using a rezoning as a precedent for the development of other parcels
in the area, and the negative externalities of multi-unit development on the en-
vironment of residential neighborhoods. Id.
In the post-Kropf era real estate developers will be faced with the inequitable
burden of proving either that there exists no reasonable governmental interest
that is advanced by the zoning classification or that the zoning classification has
no rational purpose in excluding other types of legitimate uses from the area in
dispute. Under either test, the following problems arise: (1) the developer is
faced with the burden of proving a "negative," which is an unreasonable task;
(2) the consideration of the regional public interest in certain land uses is aban-
doned; and (3) the Euclidean myth of the incompatibility of apartment develop-
ment with single-family residences is presented as an empirical fact. For a critique
of the Euclidean myth see note 9 supra. Under the Kropf legitimate use doctrine,
it is the totality of the exclusion that is emphasized, not the regional need for the
particular land use in question. 291 Mich. at ...... , 215 N.W.2d at 185. From an
urban planning perspective, the principal difficulty with the doctrine arises from its
failure to allow for a consideration of the trade-offs between regional housing policy
and local fiscal and cultural interests. The only consolation that can be derived
from the Kropf decision is that it failed to overrule the majority interpretation of
the Bristow preferred use doctrine and test for zoning validity. For an analysis of
this majority interpretation see text at notes 30-36 supra.
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